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THE  CONDITION  OF THE U.S.  ECONOMY improved in almost every respect 
after the initiation of the wage-price control program on August 15, 1971. 
Real gross national product grew rapidly, unemployment finally began to 
decline, and the rate of inflation moderated. But the coincidence of timing 
does not necessarily  mean that controls are an essential condition for pros- 
perity, or that the August  1971 message was the key that unlocked the 
floodgates behind which real aggregate demand had been restrained. The 
major task of this paper is to assess the effect of the controls by comparing 
the actual performance of the economy with its performance without con- 
trols as predicted by an econometric model fitted to the precontrol period. 
Since the reliability  of econometric inflation equations is subject to doubt in 
light of their inaccurate predictions in the late 1960s, a substantial portion 
of the paper is devoted to an assessment of the stability of the coefficients in 
several recently published wage equations. 
The determination of the four basic macroeconomic magnitudes-nomi- 
nal (current dollar) income, real output, prices, and unemployment-is 
usefully separated  into three subproblems:  (1) the determination  of nominal 
income, (2) the division of that nominal income between real output and 
prices, and (3) the relationship between real output and unemployment. 
This paper concentrates on the second problem and assumes that nominal 
income is determined independently of the control program by past and 
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current  monetary and fiscal policy. Once the paths of real output and infla- 
tion with and without the controls are determined, a simple "Okun's law" 
equation is used to compute the implied alternative paths of the unemploy- 
ment rate.1 
Before the achievement of the control program can be evaluated, a cri- 
terion for its "success" should be established. By my standard,  controls can 
be judged "successful" if the value to society of the reduction in inflation 
they achieve relative to that which would have occurred without them is 
greater than the direct and indirect costs imposed by the control program. 
As I have argued previously, once inflation in the U.S.  economy had, in 
1968-71, settled down to a rate that was expected to continue at roughly 5 
percent per annum, the attempt to reduce it did little good and caused posi- 
tive harm by redistributing  income from debtors to creditors.2  The costs of 
the control program itself are impossible to measure but must be substan- 
tial, mainly in terms of the time lost by corporate executives, small business- 
men, and landlords who must make reports, estimate productivity,  and plan 
avoidance strategies, and in terms of the inequities imposed by an arbitrary 
decision process. Thus, when the small benefits and nonnegligible costs of 
the program are taken into account, it cannot be deemed a success even 
though the econometric simulations in this paper do demonstrate that it 
achieved a significant quantitative reduction in inflation. 
Can  the Data Distinguish  among  Alternative  Models? 
Inflation equations were an Achilles' heel in many econometric models 
during the late 1  960s. The acceleration of inflation was underpredicted  con- 
sistently and was explained only after it had occurred. The most important 
cause of weakness was the low variance of the rate of inflation in the pre- 
1966 period, which disguised the full impact on wages of a sustained period 
1. The equation linking real output and unemployment,  as well as those used to 
derive explanatory  variables  in forecasts, is contained in Appendix B of my "Inflation 
in Recession  and Recovery,"  Brookinigs  Papers oni  Econiomic Activity (1 :1971), pp. 105- 
58. All Appendix B equations have been reestimated  through 1972:2. Simulations  and 
estimates  of all equations  are based  on data revisions  available  on August 15, 1972. For 
Okun's  law, see Arthur  M. Okun, "Potential  GNP: Its Measurement  and Significance," 
in American  Statistical Association,  Proceedings of the Businiess  anld  Economic Statistics 
Sectioni (1962), pp. 98-104. 
2. See my "Steady Anticipated Inflation: Mirage or Oasis?" Brookings  Papers on 
Econtomic  Activity (2:1971),  pp. 499-510. Robert J. Gordon  387 
of substantial inflation. Since the feedback of inflation on wages did not 
begin to reveal itself until the late 1960s, any econometric model of U.S. 
wage-price relationships with coefficients estimated from a sample period 
ending before, say, 1968, should be considered obsolete, at least until re- 
estimated. Thus I limit my attention to three relatively recent studies, those 
of Eckstein-Brinner,  Perry, and myself.3 
The wage equations in these studies are viewed as alternative models to 
simulate the control period. There is no similar issue of comparing price 
equations. That equation is absent from Perry's work, and it contains the 
same explanatory variables in the  Eckstein-Brinner approach as in my 
own.4 While similar in explaining the rate of wage increase as a function 
primarily of labor market pressure and past inflation, the wage equations 
contain important differences  in the variables used to represent labor mar- 
ket pressures and in the specification of the feedback of previous inflation. 
Both Perry and Gordon emphasize labor market variables that differ from 
the conventional aggregate  unemployment rate. Perry  introduces a weighted 
unemployment rate and unemployment dispersion index and supports a 
"guidepost dummy," while Gordon confirms his dispersion variable, sup- 
plements it with "disguised" unemployment and "the unemployment of 
hours" as dual proxies for excess labor demand, and rejects the guidepost 
dummy. Eckstein and Brinner,  on the other hand, support the conventional 
unemployment rate in combination with a guidepost dummy, and deny any 
role in the inflation process to shifts in labor market structure. Perry intro- 
duces past inflation as last period's change in the consumer price index, 
whereas I use the consumption deflator of the national income accounts 
with lags estimated from an interest rate equation, and Eckstein and Brin- 
ner combine the recent change in the consumption deflator with an "infla- 
tion threshold" variable; these differences imply quite different responses 
of wage change to inflation in both the short and the long run. The papers 
also  differ in their treatment of  three supplementary factors: the social 
security tax, the personal income tax, and divergences between the price 
indexes for consumption goods and for aggregate output. 
3.  Otto  Eckstein  and  Roger  Brinner, The ltIflationi  Process  in the  Uniited States,  A 
Study Prepared  for the Use of the Joint Economic  Committee,  92 Cong. 2 sess. (1972); 
George L. Perry,  "Changing  Labor Markets  and Inflation,"  Brookinigs Papers  on Eco- 
tiomic Activity (3:1970), pp. 411-41; Gordon, "Inflation  in Recession  and Recovery." 
4.  Minor  difTerences  in the Eckstein-Brinner  price equation  concern the definition  of 
"standard"  productivity,  the standardization  of "standard"  and actual unit labor cost, 
and the specification  of lag distributions. 388  Brookings Papers on Econotmic  Activity, 2:1972 
The selection among alternative wage equations for simulation of the 
wage-price  control period can be approached in either or both of two ways. 
First, the goodness of fit and stability of coefficients of the alternative  equa- 
tions can be examined for several precontrol sample periods, and the "best" 
equation can be selected for the simulations. Or, second, several simulation 
tests might be conducted on the period of controls using each of  several 
alternative wage equations. In this paper I have chosen the first approach, 
both because a time constraint has limited the number of equations that 
can be simulated and because it yields interesting conclusions in itself. Do 
the data provide any grounds for choosing among alternative hypotheses, 
or must we remain agnostic about the best method of specifying effects like 
those of labor market pressure and past inflation? Are there statistically 
significant  differences  in fit between otherwise similar equations using alter- 
native unemployment rates? Is the rejection of the accelerationist hypoth- 
esis in most previous wage studies based on statistically significant differ- 
ences between coefficients? How  much do  fitted coefficients vary across 
alternative sample periods? The first part of this paper is devoted to a de- 
tailed scrutiny of the Eckstein-Brinner,  Gordon, and Perry wage equations 
to separate  the questions that are answered  conclusively from those that are 
not. 
CRITERIA  FOR  COMPARING  WAGE  EQUATIONS 
Although primary interest centers on comparing the statistical signifi- 
cance of alternative labor market and inflation variables, published wage 
equations differ  along numerous other dimensions. Without some standard- 
ization of approach a vast number of equations can be estimated, differing 
in the source of the wage series, the number of quarters over which wage 
change is defined, the beginning and ending dates of the saniple period, and 
the precise definition of independent variables. In order to focus the com- 
parisons on alternative hypotheses and minimize the attention to  trivial 
details, the following choices were imposed on all wage equations: 
1. Source of wage series. As a measure of wages, Perry used compensa- 
tion per manhour, whereas I developed a series on hourly earnings cor- 
rected for changes in overtime and interindustry employment shifts that 
was used both in my study and by Eckstein and Brinner. The index used 
here is identical with that in my earlier paper through 1963:4, and there- Robert J. Gorcdon  389 
after substitutes a more refined index that the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
has recently begun to publish regularly.5 
2.  Form of wage change. Both Perry and Eckstein-Brinner  expressed the 
dependent variable in the form of four-quarter changes, and their results 
exhibit a substantial degree of first-order positive serial correlation. My 
1971 estimates used two-quarter changes to reduce positive serial correla- 
tion  and rejected one-quarter changes due to  substantial negative serial 
correlation. I  have subsequently discovered that the extent  of  negative 
serial correlation with one-quarter changes is approximately the same as 
the extent of positive serial correlation with two-quarter changes (Durbin- 
Watson statistics of about 2.5 and 1.5, respectively). Hence I now exhibit 
estimates for both forms of the dependent variable and assume that the two 
estimated coefficients for each independent variable bracket the  "best" 
estimate. 
3.  Sample  period. The three studies differ in the starting date of the sam- 
ple period. While all excluded the Korean war period, Perry  chose to begin 
in  1953:1, Eckstein-Brinner in  1955:1, and I in  1954:1. This study uses 
1954:1 both because it represents  a compromise and because most of 1953, 
a period of very low unemployment and only moderate inflation, appears 
to have been influenced by the Korean war controls. The terminal quarter, 
1970:4, is that chosen previously by Eckstein-Brinner  and myself and goes 
two years beyond the Perry sample period; while the sample period could 
be stretched by inclusion of the first two, precontrol, quarters of  1971, 1 
prefer to "save" these for the simulations. 
4.  Simultaneity. Both the Eckstein-Brinner  and Gordon studies (but not 
Perry's)  are subject to criticism for inclusion of current-period  price change 
in the wage equation. In this paper all inflation variables have been rede- 
fined to exclude current inflation. 
5.  For-m  of independent  variables. All variables are constructed from an 
identical set of fully revised data.6 Any variable expressed as a level (rather 
5. As before,  this wage  index  is adjusted  for fringe  benefits;  the level of the wage index 
is multiplied  by the ratio  of compensation  of employees  to wages and salaries  in the na- 
tional income  accounts  (Siurvey  ol Current  Biusitiess,  Table 1.10).  The replacement  of my 
original  series by the BLS series for the period  startilg in 1964:1 accounts for the sub- 
stantial  reduction  in standard  errors  in my fitted wage equation  as compared  with that 
in the 1971  paper. 
6. Sources  are listed in my "Inflation  in Recession  and Recovery,"  pp. 155-58. The 
appendix below contains a list (alphabetically  by symbol) of all variables  used in thlis 
paper.  The Eckstein-Brinner  equation  is specified  exactly  as in their  paper  (p. 4); Gordon's 390  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1972 
than as a rate of change) is entered directly in the equations with the one- 
quarter wage change as dependent variable, and as a two-quarter average 
for the two-quarter wage-change equations. All level variables are multi- 
plied by appropriate  constants to make coefficients apply to annual rates of 
change (that is, 0.5 in the two-quarter  case and 0.25 in the one-quarter  case), 
and are thus comparable to the published results of Eckstein-Brinner  and 
Perry.7 
RESULTS  OF  SENSITIVITY  TESTS 
Sensitivity tests must allow for interactions among variables, or the re- 
sults may be misleading. An important conclusion of this section is that 
Eckstein-Brinner  prematurely  discarded Perry's hypothesis that a changing 
labor market structure has shifted the Phillips curve, simply because alter- 
native labor market variables were compared without consideration of 
possible interactions with  Perry's other variables. To  provide an  "un- 
biased" appraisal of the effect of the three labor market and inflation hy- 
potheses, each is introduced in three separate trials corresponding to the 
Eckstein-Brinner,  Gordon, and Perry  sets of "other" variables. This creates 
nine combinations for the labor market tests and nine more for the inflation 
tests. 
Labor  market variables. The most complicated comparison is among the 
alternative labor market hypotheses. Table I has nine columns correspond- 
ing to  the nine possible combinations of the three sets of labor market 
variables with the three sets of "other" variables. Each coefficient, t-statistic, 
standard  error, and Durbin-Watson statistic is exhibited twice, with that es- 
timated from the equation with the two-quarter wage change as dependent 
variable exhibited as the top member of each pair and the one-quarter ver- 
sion displayed underneath. The first column displays the Eckstein-Brinner 
basic equation, and columns (2) and (3) replace the Eckstein-Brinner  labor 
market variables  with those of Gordon and Perry,  respectively, while retain- 
exactly as in equation (19), p. 124 of the paper noted above (the freely estimated  lag 
weights are used to avoid reestimating  the interest  rate equation  to reflect  revised  data 
and to exclude current-period  inflation);  and Perry's  as in equation (3), p. 425, of his 
paper cited above, with the insignificant  secondary  employment  variable omitted for 
lack of data. 
7.  Level coefficients  in my 1971  paper  (on the disguised  unemployment  rate, UD, the 
unemployment  rate of hours, UH, and the unemployment  dispersion  index, DU) must 
be multiplied  by two to be comparable  with the estimates  presented  here. Robert J. Gordon  391 
ing all other Eckstein-Brinner  variables.  A comparison of standard  errors  for 
the one-quarter changes (bottom member of each pair) supports the Eck- 
stein-Brinner  conclusion that the best-fitting equation is obtained with the 
conventional unemployment rate alone (hence the "best" standard error 
in column 1, line 7, is denoted b). This is true whether or not the guidepost 
dummy is included. However, the comparison for two-quarter changes 
(top member of each pair) is not so clear-cut. The Eckstein-Brinner ap- 
proach fits best when the guidepost dummy is included (line 7) but sig- 
nificantly less well than the Gordon variables when the guidepost dummy 
is omitted (line 8).8 A decision between the two approaches then depends 
on  one's  willingness to  accept the  conclusion  that the  guideposts con- 
ceivably could have reduced the rate of change of wages by as much as 0.7 
percent at an annual rate.9 
The next set of three columns introduces the alternative labor market 
variables into equations that otherwise are specified as in my paper. For 
the one-quarter  equations the Gordon labor market variables fit best either 
with or without the guidepost dummy, with a statistically significant mar- 
gin in the latter case. In the two-quarter variants the margin is more sig- 
nificant, and the conventional unemployment rate has the wrong sign when 
added to the equation (column 5, line 11). 
Still a different outcome occurs in the final three columns. The Gordon 
variables fit best both  with and without the guidepost dummy, but the 
Perry approach supplemented by the conventional unemployment rate is 
marginally better than Gordon-cum-guideposts (column  8, line 7,  com- 
pared with column 9, line 9). However, either with or without the conven- 
tional unemployment rate (1/U),  the Perry inverse of the weighted unem- 
ployment rate (1/U*)  does not come close to statistical significance. 
Overall, Table 1 clearly demonstrates the interaction of the labor market 
variables with the others. The conventional unemployment rate combined 
with the guidepost dummy performs best by itself with other variables 
specified as in the Eckstein-Brinner  approach, but must be supplemented 
by unemployment dispersion (not  weighted unemployment) in the Perry 
8. All comparisons  of statistical significance  refer to F tests at the 5 percent level 
carried  out as suggested in Franklin M. Fisher, "Tests of  Equality between Sets of 
Coefficients  in Two Linear Regressions:  An Expository  Note," Econometrica,  Vol. 38 
(March  1970), p. 363. 
9. The best-fitting  two-quarter  equation uses Perry's  variables  with the unemploy- 
ment rate added (column 3, line 9) but must be rejected  because  the coefficient  on the 
weighted  unemployment  rate (1/U*) has the wrong sign (not shown). *~~~  g *r  *o  .00  m  \  e  * 
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approach, while in the Gordon equations conventional unemployment is 
completely insignificant. The unemployment dispersion index is strongly 
significant in the Gordon and Perry approaches, but not in that of Eckstein 
and Brinner. The disguised unemployment rate (UD)  is significant in every 
approach, but the unemployment rate of hours is less so and is completely 
insignificant when introduced into the Perry equations (column 8, line 5). 
The guidepost dummy is important for Eckstein-Brinner and Perry, par- 
ticularly the latter (compare standard errors in column 9, lines 7 and 8), 
but not for Gordon. Finally, the best overall fit is obtained with the Gordon 
approach for both labor market and other variables (column 5); a determi- 
nation of whether the margin of superiority is contributed by the inflation 
or tax variables awaits further comparisons. 
Inflation variables. Fortunately the comparison for the alternative infla- 
tion variables is much simpler to digest. The first column in Table 2 exhibits 
coefficients fitted in the basic Eckstein-Brinner  equation (the same equation 
as that displayed in Table 1, column 1). The influence of past inflation on 
wage change is represented by two variables.10  The first (g(1*) is the recent 
change in the personal consumption deflator  (PCD) with a short distributed 
lag introduced with imposed weights. The second is the "inflation thresh- 
old" variable gdT,  which is equal to the average annual rate of change of 
PCD over the past two years when that rate of change is above 2.5 percent, 
but equal to zero otherwise. The next two columns replace the Eckstein- 
Brinner inflation variables with, respectively, the Gordon and Perry infla- 
tion variables in equations that are otherwise identical to column  1. The 
first Gordon inflation variable is a distributed lag on the rate of change of 
the same PCD series that Eckstein and Brinner use, but the weights are 
freely estimated rather  than imposed. The second is a distributed lag on the 
difference between the rate of change of the price of nonfarm output and 
the price of consumption goods.'1  Perry's variable is simply the rate &f 
change in the consumer price index (CPI), lagged one period. 
A  comparison of  the first three columns  indicates that the  Eckstein- 
Brinner inflation variables work marginally better in their equation than 
the Gordon  variables (the difference is  not  statistically significant), but 
10. For variables  used in this paper,  g indicates  the rate of growth. 
1  1. This variable  reflects  the analytic  presumption  that, with  the price  of consumption 
goods unchanged,  an increase  in the price  of nonconsumption  goods raises  the marginal 
revenue  product  of labor and hence tends to pull up wages if labor is paid the value of 
its marginal  product. Robert J. Gordon  395 
much better than the Perry CPI variable. On the other hand, the Gordon 
inflation variables fit significantly better in both the Gordon  and Perry 
equations (columns 4-6 and 7-9, respectively).  The most interesting feature 
of Table 2 is the clear evidence of interaction among variables. The coeffi- 
cients on all of the inflation variables are substantially higher when intro- 
duced into the Eckstein-Brinner  equation (first three columns) than in the 
Gordon or Perry  equation. The Eckstein-Brinner  approach, which uses the 
conventional unemployment rate as its only labor market variable, cannot 
explain the marked wage change in the late 1960s without heavy emphasis 
on the influence of recent inflation, whereas the Gordon and Perry equa- 
tions emphasize structural  shifts in labor market variables and leave less to 
be explained by inflation. This is especialiy true of the Perry approach, in 
which the high coefficient on unemployment dispersion (Table 1, column 9) 
is offset by low inflation coefficients, and which thus is furthest from sup- 
porting the accelerationist hypothesis that the sum of the inflation coeffi- 
cients is equal to unity. 
Another interesting feature of Table 2 is the sensitivity of the coefficients 
on the first Eckstein-Brinner  inflation variable  (gd*)  to the form in which the 
equation is fitted. The variable is statistically insignificant  in the one-quarter 
equations, but in the two-quarter equations the coefficient doubles and the 
t-ratio becomes significant; and in the Eckstein-Brinner  published equation 
based on four-quarter changes, the coefficient doubles again to 0.496 and 
the t-ratio climbs to 7.3.  Yet the two-quarter and four-quarter versions 
exhibit a substantial degree of positive serial correlation, indicating that 
both the t-ratios and the size of the coefficient itself are seriously biased.'2 
In the more reliable one-quarter versions, which display no significantly 
autocorrelated disturbances,  the entire contribution of past inflation works 
through the threshold variable, which has particularly unstable coefficients 
in Table 2 and even more so in Table 3 below. 
Finally, Table 2, line 6, exhibits the mean lag of the past influence of con- 
sumer prices on wage change. Perry appears to have substantially under- 
estimated the mean lag by restricting past inflation to the simple form of a 
one-quarter  lag. The relatively short Eckstein-Brinner  lag on gd* is offset by 
the relatively long lag attached to their threshold variable (5.0 quarters). 
12. The Durbin-Watson  statistics  in the two- and four-quarter  versions  are 1.27  and 
0.77, respectively  (the latter  is displayed  in the Eckstein-Brinner  paper,  lJIhctioil Process, 
p. 4), and both are sufficiently  low to cause rejection  of the hypothesis  of nonautocorre- 
lated disturbances  in favor of the hypothesis  of positive  autocorrelation. ss  ~~~*  Kt  N  O  *  *  o 
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Thus a "weighted  average"  mean lag calculated for this approach, displayed 
in brackets on line 6, is very similar to the lags estimated directly for the 
Gordon inflation variable. 
Tax variables. Changes in both the social security tax and personal in- 
come tax enter into the basic Gordon equation, while Perry uses only the 
former and Eckstein-Brinner  only the latter. The sensitivity tests strongly 
support the inclusion of both, since both enter with significant t-ratios in 
all of the equations estimated in Tables 1 and 2.  13The tax variables are the 
factor explaining the better overall fit of the Gordon equations in columns 
4, 5, and 6 of Tables 1 and 2, compared with those of Eckstein-Brinner  and 
Perry, whatever labor market or inflation variables are introduced.14 
Changes  in sample  period. How dependent are the results of the previous 
comparison on the sample period chosen? Although equations could be 
fitted for many sample subperiods, the most interesting comparison is be- 
tween the period ending in 1970:4 and subperiods that exclude some or all 
of the high inflation period of the late 1960s. Equations for three alternative 
sample periods are displayed in Table 3, ending respectively in  1966:4, 
1968:4, and 1970:4. The coefficients are most stable on 1/U  (in the Eck- 
stein-Brinner  equation), UD, UHf, gd*,  and the social security tax variables. 
The least stable coefficients are on the Perry weighted unemployment rate, 
which becomes insignificant  in the period ending 1970:4; on the unemploy- 
ment dispersion index, which has a low significance  level in the Gordon and 
Perry  equations ending in 1966:4; and on the Gordon inflation  (gde)  and the 
Eckstein-Brinner  threshold  inflation  (g(dl')  variables.  In addition, the size 
of the Gordon employee tax variable drops substantially in the period end- 
ing 1970:4. 
13. To maintain  conformity  with my 1971  paper,  the distributed  lag weights  and sum 
of coefficients  on the employers'  social security  tax variable  are constrained.  As a cross- 
check, the weight on the constrained  series of coefficients  was estimated  freely; it fell 
consistently  into the range  0.8 to 1.0, as compared  withl  the constraint  of 1.0. Also the 
social security  coefficient  in Perry's  equation  consistently  falls in the range  0.9 to 1.0 (see 
Table 3). 
14. The only exception to this statement  is the one-quarter  comparison  in Table 2, 
which  indicates  that for a given  inflation  variable  Perry's  approach  for the other  variables 
fits  as well as Gordon's.  The superiority  of the two-quarter  Gordon  versions  suggests  that 
the effect of the personal  tax rate, which IS  isincluded  in the Gordon approach  but not in 
Perry's,  may be represented  more  accurately  by a two-quarter  average  than by a simple 
one-quarter  change. This conjecture  is supported  by a substantial  improvement  in fit 
when the two-quarter  personal  tax change is introduced  into the one-quarter  equation 
(not shown). Robert J. Gordon  401 
Each equation taken as a whole exhibits a shift in the size of at least one 
coefficient between 1966:4 and 1970:4 as it attempts to explain the extent 
of  the  1967-70 inflation. The  Eckstein-Brinner equation calls  upon the 
threshold inflation variable, which is insignificant in the first two sample 
periods but suddenly leaps into significance to explain the 1969-70 period. 
In the one-quarter version for the first two sample periods, in fact, neither 
Eckstein-Brinner inflation variable is  significant, and the  pace of  wage 
change is explained entirely by unemployment, the guidepost dummy, and 
personal tax changes. Because its statistical significance relies entirely on 
the addition of the eight 1969-70 observations to the sample period, the 
threshold inflation variable is equivalent to a dummy variable invoked to 
explain a particular set of eight observations. 
The Gordon equation also explains the acceleration of inflation in 1967- 
70 by a steady increase in the coefficient on past inflation. The size of the 
increase is, however, less dramatic than in the case of the Eckstein-Brinner 
threshold variable, because the Gordon equation explains at least part of 
the 1967  -70 episode as due to factors other than inflation-an  increase in 
unemployment dispersion, a drop in disguised unemployment, and an in- 
crease in personal and social security tax rates. The Perry  equation explains 
the  1969-70 period completely without reliance on an inflation variable 
through (1) the increase between 1968:4 and 1970:4 in the coefficient on 
unem-ployment  dispersion, and (2) the drop in the coefficient on weighted 
unemploynment,  which prevents the increase in unemployment in the 1970 
recession from influencing the prediction of wage change. 
THE  TRADEOFF  BETWEEN  ALTERNATIVE  HYPOTHESES 
Further evidence on the choice between past inflation and changing labor 
market structure as the major explanation of the acceleration in wage in- 
creases in the late 1960s is supplied by constraining the sum of the coeffi- 
cients on past inflation at various values rather than estimating it freely. 
The basic Gordon one-quarter wage equation has been estimated with the 
coefficient sum constrained at intervals of 0.1 between 0.0 and 1.2, and this 
experiment has been repeated for the three sample periods examined in 
Table 3 above. The bottom frame in Figure 1 exhibits the percentage of 
variance explained for three sample periods and for each alternative con- 
straint on the sum of inflation coefficients. For instance, the line for the 
1966:4 sample period indicates that the percentage of variance explained 402  Brookings Papers on Econonmic  Activity, 2:1972 
Figure 1. The Wage Acceleration-Unemployment  Dispersion  Tradeoffa 
Ratio of coefficientt  to valuie  in?  basic equation 
2. 5 
UH 
2.0  00.0 
-  S..~91  -9'  1.0  e;  -  T 
0.5 
-  DU  UD~~~~gil 
-T  I.o 
t-ratio~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~'e-  o 
8.0 
6.0 
2~~~~~~  U0  D  5  %  con1fidence 
Percentl of variantce  exrplainled 





O  f  1  1  1  l  I  I  I  I ~~~~~~~~~~g  i  I  TO  1  1, 
0  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.8  0.9  1.0  1.1  1.2 
Sum of coefficienlts  onl  inlflationl  (gde) 
Source: Derived from basic Gordon equation described in text. 
a.  Symbols are the same as those identified in Table 3 above. Robert J. Gordon  403 
ranges from 0.65 for a 0.0 constraint to a maximum of 0.72 for the best- 
fitting 0.4 constraint, back to a minimum of 0.38 for the 1.2 constraint.'5 
The bottom frame in Figure 1 reveals two consistent patterns as the sam- 
ple  period is extended from  1966:4 to  1970:4.  First, the percentage of 
variance explained rises; second, the best-fitting coefficient sum rises from 
0.4 in the early period to almost 0.8 in the last period. 
Since the true coefficient on past inflation is higher than has been esti- 
mated in past published studies with relatively "early" sample periods, 
other conclusions of those studies may require reexamination if there are 
important interactions between the effects of inflation and other explana- 
tory variables. The top frame in Figure 1 illustrates the interaction of the 
alternative constraints on past inflation with the estimated coefficients on 
the other variables in the basic Gordon wage equation for the 1970:4 sam- 
ple period. The solid line shows the steady decline in the freely estimated 
coefficient on the unemployment dispersion index as the constraint on past 
inflation is raised from 0.0 to 1.2. The parallel decline in the t-ratio on un- 
employment dispersion is illustrated by the solid line in the middle frame 
of Figure 1. This pronounced inflation-dispersion tradeoff explains the di- 
vergent conclusions of Eckstein-Brinner  and Perry on the primary  cause of 
the wage-change  acceleration of the late 1960s. Perry used an inflation vari- 
able that yielded a low coefficient and thus concluded that unemployment 
dispersion is important; Eckstein-Brinner used other inflation variables, 
which yielded high coefficients, and thus concluded that dispersion is not 
important. I occupied an intermediate position in my previous, 1971 paper 
and argued that both factors are important. The confidence band on  the 
inflation coefficient stretches from 0.4 to  1.0 for the latest sample period, 
and since this encompasses t-ratios on unemployment dispersion between 
4.7 and 0.4, no conclusion can be reached by this approach on the relative 
importance of either variable. 
Coefficients on the other variables in the equation appear to  be more 
stable. All  have t-ratios greater than the 5 percent confidence level for 
values of the inflation coefficient above 0.6.16  The hours unemployment and 
product price variables interact positively with inflation and have coeffi- 
cients that increase as the inflation constraint is raised, whereas the coeffi- 
15. The best-fitting  equation is displayed  in column 4 of Table 3. 
16. The t-ratios  in Figure 1 for the constrained  version  of the equation  do not corre- 
spond to those in Tables I to 3 since the dependent  variable  is constrained  and hence 
its variance  is different  from what it would be without  constraint. 404  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1972 
cient on disguised unemployment declines somewhat. While most of the 
variance of the dispersion variable takes the form of a rising time trend in 
the 1960s as inflation accelerates, the disguised unemployment coefficient 
is less collinear with inflation. The most stable coefficient is that on the 
employee tax variable, which  does not appear  to interact with inflation at all. 
To summarize this rather exhaustive set of comparisons of wage equa- 
tions, a few conclusions do seem to hold up: 
* Perry's emphasis on a shift in labor market structure through the un- 
employment dispersion variable is confirmed even when the coefficient on 
past inflation is allowed to vary. 
o Disguised unemployment and variations in personal tax rates can ex- 
plain slow wage increases  in the 1962-65 period without reliance on a guide- 
post dummy, and imply that the moderation in wages previously attributed 
to the guidepost program would have occurred anyway. 
* The product price, personal tax, and social security tax variables are 
consistently significant for all sample periods. 
.  Multicollinearity clouds the verdict on the relative roles of hours unem- 
ployment, Perry's weighted unemployment rate, and the conventional un- 
employment rate. 
* While there is no evidence that the elasticity of wage change to expected 
inflation was as large as unity during the sample period, the results raise the 
possibility of a variable elasticity, as discussed below. 
A  VARIABLE  INFLATION  COEFFICIENT 
The steady and regular increase during the late 1960s on the coefficient 
of past inflation in wage equations suggests the possibility of a disequilib- 
rium adjustment process that had not been completed by the end of 1970. 
The bottom franme  of Figure 1 is consistent with the idea, which Eckstein and 
Brinner  introduced in their threshold variable, that the degree of conscious- 
ness of and adaptation to inflation depends on its expected future behavior. 
Many wage agreements and other contracts, which are stated in nominal 
terms when the expected rate of inflation is low, gradually are converted to 
real terms through inflation escalators when the expected rate of inflation 
increases. 
Simulations of alternative future economic policies may be too  "opti- 
mistic" if they assume that the partial adjustment of wage change to infla- 
tion evident in most published estimates will persist indefinitely. An alter- Robert J. Gordon  405 
native hypothesis is that the elasticity of wage change to the expected rate 
of inflation is a positive function of the expected rate of inflation itself: 
(1)  g,  t  aXt  +  bgd  ,)g(,l 
where aX1 represents the other variables multiplied by their respective co- 
efficients.  The hypothesis states that, starting from an initial position of low 
inflation and high unemployment, the elasticity of wage change (b) will be 
low, but an increase in labor market pressure will raise the rate of wage 
change not only directly, but also indirectly as higher wage change causes 
inflation, which increases the expected rate of inflation (gde)  and, in turn, 
raises the  elasticity of  wage change to  expected  inflation. The  process 
produces an accelerating inflation whenever the net contribution of the 
other variables (aX) exceeds a critical level. 
While numerous specifications of the variable coefficient hypothesis are 
possible, the data cannot distinguish among several plausible alternatives, 
and the following simple form was chosen for estimation and simulation 
pending further research: 
(2)  b, =  cgd  ,; 0  .  g,je  <  1/C 
=  1.0;  ge  >  1 /C. 
Equation (2) states that the variable response coefficient b varies linearly 
between 0.0 and 1.0 but is constrained not to move outside that range.17 
The estimates and simulations of this particular  version of the variable co- 
efficient hypothesis should be viewed as extremely tentative, both because 
more complex curvilinear relationships seem preferable  in principle to (2), 
and because the distributed lag weights used to estimate gd"  from past rates 
of inflation in (1) and (2) are assumed to be identical to those estimated in 
the fixed coefficients equation above (Table 3, column 6). Further research 
is in progress to allow the distributed lag weights and the variable b coeffi- 
cient to be estimated simultaneously. 
When (2) is substituted into (1), the wage equation is identical to those 
discussed above,  with the value of  gde  replaced by its  square. For  the 
"standard" sample period the results of the two-quarter and one-quarter 
versions of my basic equation are as follows:  18 
17. In principle,  the constraint  refers  to the absolute  value of g,l,, in order  to handle 
deflation, but none of the experimental  simulations  below results in a decline of the 
price level. 
18. The equation is identical  in all details to that in Table 3, column 6, except that 




Version  DU  U'D  UH  gp  -  gi  g(1/1-7c)  (gde)2  estimate 
Two-quarter  0.0400  -0.577  -0.289  0.578  0.219  28.5  0.00212 
(3.19)  (-  5.55)  (--1.85)  (3.73)  (5.36)  (6.95) 
One-quarter  0.0474  -0.579  -0.323  0.603  0.139  52.1  0.00181 
(2.60)  (-3.65)  (-1.44)  (2.44)  (2.53)  (4.22) 
In comparison with the same equation fitted with a fixed b coefficient, 
displayed in Table 3, column 6, the fit of the variable coefficient version is 
slightly but not significantly better. Coefficients on other variables are very 
similar. An interesting feature of the variable coefficient version is the in- 
creased coefficient and t-ratio of unemployment dispersion, indicating that 
both an increased reaction to  past inflation and changing labor market 
structure  contributed to the inflation of the late 1960s. The coefficient c on 
the squared inflation term can be interpreted from (2). The elasticity of 
wage change to expected inflation becomes unity when the expected infla- 
tion rate equals l/c,  estimated in the two-quarter equation as  1/28.5  (a 
two-quarter percentage rate of 3.51 and annual rate of 7.02), and in the 
one-quarter  equation as 1/52.1 (a one-quarter rate of 1.92 and annual rate 
of 7.67). 
While these results must be viewed as tentative and might be sensitive to 
alternative specifications of the variable coefficient hypothesis, their impli- 
cations are extremely important. The variable coefficient approach has the 
advantage that it reconciles (1) the partial adjustment observed in most 
postwar econometric studies of wage behavior; (2) the steady increase in 
the size of the partial adjustment  coefficient as the sample period is extended 
into the late 1960s; (3) the accelerationist hypothesis that the rate of infla- 
tion will steadily accelerate if the unemployment rate is permanently main- 
tained below a certain "natural" rate; and (4) the relative flatness of the 
Phillips curve to the right of the natural rate evident in the absence of any 
apparent tendency to accelerating  deflation  during the last half of the Great 
Depression. If this hypothesis is correct, policy makers  may have to dampen 
the pace of the current economic  recovery or maintain controls  perma- 
nently to  prevent inflation from accelerating, as illustrated below in the 
simulations of hypothetical future growth paths. Robert J. Gordon  407 
STABILITY  OF  COEFFICIENTS  IN  PRICE  EQUATION 
In comparison with the complexity and controversy surrounding the 
choice of the best explanation of wage change, the equation that relates 
prices to wages is a tranquil oasis. As illustrated in Table 4, the equation 
developed in my 1971 paper retains relatively stable coefficients for several 
alternative  sample periods. The sum of the coefficients on the recent change 
in standard unit labor cost remains insignificantly different from unity for 
each sample period, and the equation thus predicts a constant distribution 
of income in long-run simulations. The equation indirectly explains varia- 
tions in the share of profits in income by directly explaining changes in the 
ratio of price to unit labor cost, a ratio that is highly correlated by defini- 
tion with the share of profits in total income. 
Simulation Experiments 
The  simulation experiments are based on  a two-equation  price-wage 
model, fitted to the period ending in 1970:4, with the price and wage equa- 
tions specified exactly as in my 1971 paper (see Table 4, column 3, above, 
for price equation; Table 3, column 6, for wage equation). Since the speci- 
Table 4.  Estimated Price Equations  for Alternative  Sample Periods 
Beginning with 1954:2a 
Endclinig  clate oJ scamlple  period 
Variable orsuimnmary  statistdc  1966:4  1968.4  1970:4 
Vcaricable 
Standard unit labor cost  (g,w,q')  1.1101,  0.8891,  0.964') 
(4.73)  (4.68)  (6.42) 
Change in ratio of actual to potential  -0.  182b  -0.221b  -0.238b) 
productivity  (gq,q')  (-1.41)  (-1.74)  (-1.92) 
Change in ratio of compensation  to wage  0.671  0.533  0.537 
rate index (gcm!ulv)  (3.50)  (2.86)  (2.88) 
Change in ratio of unfilled  orders  to  0.021  0.024  0.023 
capacity  (gUFK'K)  (2.83)  (3.17)  (2.96) 
Summary statistic 
Standard  error  0.00197  0.00203  0.00212 
Durbin-Watson  2.31  2.40  2.47 
Source: Derived fromii  equation developed in  'Inflation in Recession and Recovery." See appendix for 
sources of the basic data. 
a.  The dependent vairiable  is the one-quarter  change in the fixed-weight nonfarni private deflator. 
b.  Coefficient is sum of a series of distributed lag coefficients. 408  Brookings  Papers  on  Economic  Activity,  2:1972 
fication of my previous paper is reproduced, simulations can test the per- 
formance of the model on data available after its construction. Simulations 
were also run with both the basic fixed coefficient version and the variable 
coefficient version of the wage equation. 
Figure 2 displays a full dynamic simulation of the interaction of the fixed 
coefficient wage and price equations in the 1954-71 period. All simulations 
are calculated for one-quarter changes, but for the sake of clarity, four- 
quarter overlapping changes are exhibited, except for the two post-sample 
quarters  of 1971, where one-quarter  changes are displayed.1, Employing in- 
formation on the history of wages and prices only through 1953:4, and the 
values of all exogenous variables in the wage and price equations, but gen- 
erating its own estimates of wages and expected prices, the model is able to 
track the inflation rate very closely; the only exceptions are a moderate 
overprediction for the 1954 recession, for the 1959-60 interval, and for the 
period of accelerating  inflation during 1968 and 1969.  The standard error of 
the predicted price series in the full dynamic simulation (0.002113) is ac- 
tually lower  than the standard  error in the fitted price equation based on the 
trUe exogenous wage (0.002116). Errors in the wage and price equations 
therefore appear to be offsetting and do not cumulate during the sample 
period. In the two post-sample quarters of 1971, the model's prediction of 
an average annual rate of inflation of 3.91 percent is considerably lower 
than the actual average rate of 4.65 percent, although a similar simulation 
based on the variable coefficient wage equation comes somewhat closer to 
the mark with a prediction of 4.25 percent.20 
An interesting feature of the simulation is its ability to track the ratio of 
price to unit labor cost (PULC),  which is a good  proxy for the ratio of 
profits to sales. The close tracking of this aspect of the profits squeeze of 
the 1968-70 period lends credibility to the estimates of the effects on profits 
of the controls program discussed below. 
THE  WAGE-PRICE  CONTROL  PROGRAM 
The basic purpose of this paper is a comparison of the actual perfor- 
mance of wages and prices during the control period with the performance 
19. For the wage equation the coefficients  in the simulations  are an a veracge  of the 
coefficients  for the one-quarter  and two-quarter  versions  displayed  in Table 3, column  6. 
20. For the final  quarter  (1971:2) before  the freeze  "turned  out the lights,"  the actual 
rate was 3.95 percent,  as compared  with a variable  coefficient  prediction of  3.85 and 
fixed coefficient  prediction  of 3.50 based  on the full 1954-71 simulations. *  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~00  4 
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predicted  by the model  in simulations  for 1971:3  through  1972:2  for "sim- 
ilar economic conditions."  This similarity  can be specified  in terms of 
either  real or nominal  variables,  but the former  are more natural  because 
they drive  the model.  Since  price  and wage  changes  have  been  erratic  dur- 
ing the first  year of controls,  with an initial  freeze  and then a partial  re- 
bound,  Table  5 contains  comparisons  only  of the average  performance  over 
the control  period,  with a three-quarter  interval  chosen  to maintain  com- 
parability  with  the Bosworth  paper  in this volume.  All variables  other  than 
prices,  expected  prices,  and wages  are  set at their  actual  values  in the simu- 
lation, which begins in 1971:3 and "inherits"  the actual rates of price 
change  before  that quarter. 
The  first  line of Table  5 compares  the actual  rate  of wage  change  with  the 
rate the model says would have obtained  given  actual  (controlled)  prices. 
The difference  between  the actual and simulated  value (-0.48  percent) 
represents  the "partial  derivative"  of wage  change  with  respect  to actions  of 
the Pay  Board.  This  comparison  understates  the effect  of the Pay  Board  on 
newly  negotiated  agreements,  since  the actual  change  in wages  exceeded  the 
board  guidelines  due  to deferred  increases  from  previously  negotiated  con- 
tracts.  A similar  calculation  made next year for a longer  control  interval 
should  show  a greater  effect  on wage  rates. 
The second  line of Table  5 makes  a similar  comparison  of the actual  rate 
of price  change  with  the prediction  of the model given  actual  (controlled) 
wages.  The impact  of the Price  Commission  (-1.47  percent)  has been  sub- 
stantially  greater  than that of the Pay Board,  perhaps  partly  because  de- 
ferred  increases  are  less important  for prices  than  wages.  Line  3b calculates 
the total effect  of the control  program  by comparing  actual  price  change 
with  the prediction  for a no-controls  economy  generated  by a full dynamic 
simulation  of the model  with wages  and prices  both endogenous.  The esti- 
mated  difference  of -1.85  percent  is slightly  less than  the sum of the sepa- 
rate  effects  of the Pay  Board  and Price  Commission  (-1.95  percent)  due  to 
their  interaction.2' 
As George  Perry  has previously  argued,  "cost  absorption"  does not op- 
erate  symmetrically  for business  and labor;  a control  program  leaves  the 
distribution  of income  unaffected  if it moderates  the response  of wages  to 
past  price  change  while  allowing  pricesfully  to reflect  current  wage  change.22 
21. The equivalent  figure  with the variable  coefficient  wage equation  is -2.01  percent 
rather  than -  1.85 percent. 
22. George L. Perry,  "Controls  and Income Shares,"  Brookii-gs  Papers  on Ecolnomic 
Activity ( 1:1972),  pp.  191-94. Robert J. Gordon  411 
Table 5.  Comparison  of Actual and Predicted  Performance  of Selected 
Indicators  during  the Wage-Price Control  Program, through  Second Quarter 
1972 
Predicted 
Inidicator  Actutal  by model  Differenice 
Annuicial  percenitage rates of change 
I. Control by Pay Board: Wages, 
with prices exogenous  6.18  6.66  -0.48 
2. Control by Price Commission:  Prices, 
with wages exogenous  2.14  3.61  -1.47 
3. Total control program,  wages and prices 
interacting 
a.  Wages  6.18  6.86  -0.68 
b. Prices  2.14  3.99  -1.85 
Billions of dollars or percent 
4. Nonfarm private  business 
a.  Change  in ratio of price  to unit labor cost  0. 56b  2. 10b  -1.54 
b. Gross product  originating  $927.8  $942. IC  $-  14.3 
5. Nonfinancial  corporations 
a. Gross product  originating  $600.7  $610.(Y  $-9.3 
b.  Less:  indirect business taxes  -57.4  -58.  3c  -0.9 
c.  Less: all other costs and interest  -479.0  -479.0  0.0 
d. Equals: profits before taxd  64.2  72.7  -8.5 
e.  Ratio of profits  before tax to gross 
product  originating  0.107  0.119  -0.012 
Sources: Actual figures for gross product originating in nonfarm private business and for nonfinaincial 
corporations are tiomii SurveY  of  Currenzt  Buisiniess, Vol. 52 (August 1972), Tables 3, 9, pp. 11, 13. Predicted 
figures from simiiulation  of wage-price model for the four-quairter  intervail  1971:3-1972:2.  Wage and price 
changes  ale  froin  the  sourices  slhowIn  in  the  zippendix. 
a.  Totail  of three quiarterly  rates of change (1971:4,  1972:  1, and 1972:2), converted to annual rate. 
b.  For consistency both the actual price deflator and productivity index zire based on actual  1972:2 
weights, whereas fixed weights were used in calculating lines 2 and 3b (see appendix, explanation for sym- 
bol p); cumulated over four quarters  from 1971:2 to  1972:2. 
c.  Actual figure is imiultiplied  by 1.0154, the estimated increase in the ratio of price to unit lziboi cost if 
controls had iiot been in effect. 
d.  Includes inventory valuation a,djustment. 
Since  the Price  Commission  has pushed  prices  below  the level  they would 
have attained  under normal price behavior  (Table 5, line 2), the major 
distributional  effect  of the control  program  has been  to benefit  labor  at the 
expense  of business.  As indicated  on line  4a of Table  5, the ratio  of price  to 
unit  labor  cost in 1972:2  was 1.54  percent  below  the level  that would  have 
been  expected  on the basis  of actual  productivity  behavior  and past  price- 
setting  relationships.  The  cyclical  recovery  of the ratio  of price  to unit  labor 
cost has  been  only  one-quarter  the "normal"  (that  is, predicted)  rate  during 412  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1972 
the four quarters  ending 1972:2, and this implies that the controls program 
has shifted the distribution of income from nonlabor to labor income. Line 
4b of Table 5 indicates that with wage rates fixed at their actual value, gross 
nonfarm  private  business  product  would have been $14.3 billion higher with- 
out the controls. Section 5 of the table estimates that about 60 percent  of this 
difference, $8.5 billion, directly reduced nonfinancial corporate profits be- 
fore tax. The remainder  consisted of a sizable reduction in nonfarm private 
nonlabor income outside of nonfinancial corporations and a small reduc- 
tion in indirect business taxes. Since simulations of the wage-price model 
into the future (as described below) predict a further  increase in the uncon- 
trolled PULC ratio during  the current  economic expansion, the controls are 
likely to  have a  redistributional effect beyond that  which has  already 
occurred.23 
Effect qf controls  on real output  and unemployment.  The simulations with 
which the performance  of controls is compared in Table 5 implicitly assume 
a monetary and fiscal policy sufficiently accommodating to have allowed 
nominal GNP to grow faster in the absence of controls by the estimated 
effect of the controls (1.85 percent, from Table 5, line 3b), in order to "pay 
for" both exogenous real output growth and faster inflation. If, on the 
other hand, nominal income growth had been held at its actual level, a 
simulation indicates that inflation would have been virtually the same as 
reported in Table 5 above,  but real output would have been lower by 
roughly the effect of the controls. In the case of the fixed coefficients  version 
of the model, exogenous nominal GNP growth causes a 3.93 average annual 
rate of inflation over the three quarters  in place of 3.99 with exogenous real 
output; 7.15 percent real output growth in place of 8.94; and an unemploy- 
ment rate in 1972:2 of 6.19 in place of 5.77. Thus the controls have provided 
a boost to real output growth that I and several other economists had argued 
earlier could have been provided by more expansive monetary policy in 
1970 and 1971.24 
23. For instance  in Path A in Figure  3 below, the uncontrolled  PULC ratio rises by 
1.85 percent from 1972:2 to  1973:4. If the controls were to prevent  any increase  in 
PULC beyond the actual 1972:2 level, nonfarm  private  nonlabor  income would be re- 
duced by a further  $12.5 billion, or $26.8 billion wlhen  combined  with the reduction  tllat 
has already  occurred. 
24. The closeness  of the inflation  rates predicted  with nominal  income  and real out- 
put exogenous  reflects  the slhort-run  horizontal  flatness  of the Phillips  curve  in tlle wage- 
price model. See the discussion  of the short-run  tradeoff  in my "Inflation  in Recession 
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THE  LONG-RUN  UNEMPLOYMENT-INFLATION  TRADEOFF 
The wage-price model cannot predict the future of the control program 
but only the future of an uncontrolled economy, with which actual develop- 
ments can be compared as they occur. At the present time policy makers 
must make crucial decisions about the degree of restraint,  if any, that must 
be applied to prevent the present economic recovery from proceeding too 
far or too fast. If the eventual elimination of controls is planned, econo- 
metric forecasts of the behavior of a no-controls economy are of extreme 
interest. 
Both the fixed coefficient and variable coefficient versions of the model 
have been simulated for the period 1971:3 through 1986:4 on the assump- 
tion of actual growth in real output between 1971:3 and 1972:2; alterna- 
tive rates of real growth between 1972:3 and 1973:4; and steady growth 
thereafter  that maintains whatever "gap" between real actual and potential 
output is reached in 1973:4.25) Figure 3 compares the no-controls forecasts 
of the two versions of the model for two paths of economic recovery. Path 
A assumes an annual rate of output growth of 6.7 percent for the six quar- 
ters between 1972:2 and 1973:4, whereas Path B assumes a slower 5.4 per- 
cent rate for that period. Beginning in 1974: 1 real output grows perma- 
nently at its potential rate. The unemployment rate falls along both paths 
and reaches a permanent level of 4.2 percent along Path A and 4.8 percent 
along Path B.26 Under the fixed coefficient version of the model, inflation 
25. The procedures  that translate  the exogenous rate of output growth into the ex- 
planatory  variables  in the wage and price equationis  are exactly the same as those out- 
lined in Appendix B of "Inflation  in Recession and Recovery"  with equations  reesti- 
mated oni  revised  data thirouIglh  1972  :2. All tax rates  are held constant  in the future  (that 
is, beginning  in 1972:  3), except  for the social security  tax increase  scheduled  for 1973:  1, 
and the personal  tax rate is constrained  to be unchanged  in the first  hialf  of 1972  to elimi- 
nate the temporary  effect of overwithholding  on the effective  tax rate (an assumption 
also made in Table 5). 
26. If the growth of potential output is faster than the assumed  annual rate of 4.3 
percent in the 1971-73 period, real output growthi  can be greater  by a corresponding 
amount and still lead to the stated unemployment  rates. 
The only ditTerences  between  these simulations  and those in my 1971  paper  are slight 
changes in the coefficients  resulting  from the reestimation  on revised  data, as reported 
above in Tables 3 and 4, and the reestimation  of the price  equation  (for the purpose  of 
the future simulations  only) with the sum of coefficients  on standard  unit labor cost 
constrained  to equal 1.0  (rather  thian  the estimated  valuLe  of 0.964), so thlat  the distribu- 
tion of income remains  absolutely  fixed in the long run. The latter change makes the 
long-run  Phillips  curve slightly  steeper  than that in the 1971  paper. 0 
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eventually stabilizes at a 5.3 percent annual rate on Path A and 3.6 percent 
rate on Path B, both rates above the administration target of 2.5 percent 
inflation.27 
While this set of predictions may seem gloomy to administration policy 
makers, it takes on a rosily optimistic glow when set alongside the simula- 
tions of the model using the variable coefficient wage equation. In this ver- 
sion any attempt to reduce the rate of unemployment below its natural rate 
causes inflation to increase, which in turn raises the variable inflation co- 
efficient in the wage equation and causes inflation to  accelerate further. 
Along Path A the unemployment rate is pushed far below the natural rate 
and by 1986 the annual inflation rate has reached the Brazilian range (14.7 
percent) and is still accelerating. Since the natural rate of unemployment in 
the model is 4.8 percent, Path B is sufficiently conservative to maintain a 
steady inflation of 3.5 percent. If policy makers attempt to  aim for the 
natural rate and miss slightly, the consequences will not be disastrous. A 
slightly faster rate of output growth that achieves a permanent 4.55 percent 
unemployment rate causes an inflation rate that accelerates very slowly, 
reaching 4.0 percent in 1978 and "only" 5.0 percent in 1985.28 
These simulations all make the counterfactual assumption that controls 
have not been in effect in 1971-72. If it was assumed alternatively  that con- 
trols had been in effect but had been eliminated on July 1, 1972, and if 
workers were to  base their inflationary expectations of  the future on  a 
weighted average of past price change, then the low rate of inflation during 
the control period would moderate postcontrol wage demands. The lowest 
dotted line in Figure 3 assumes the Path B pattern of output growth and the 
fixed coefficient  version of the model but differs  from the dotted line directly 
above it in a starting date of 1972:3 instead of 1971:3. The intervening  year 
of controls dampens the inflation rate for a long period, with a maximum 
difference of about 0.7 percent during 1972-73 and a difference of 0.1 per- 
cent even in 1986. This result may tempt policy makers to experiment with 
an "on-off" policy that combines short periods of controls with long un- 
controlled intervals in between. The premise of this approach, however, re- 
quires that workers continue to base their postcontrol inflation predictions 
27. All statements  about the rate  of inflation  refer  to the fixed-weight  nonfarm  private 
deflator  and imply  somewhat  higher  numerical  values  for the rate  of inflation  of the GNP 
deflator. 
28. The social security  tax increase  of 1973:1 explains  the short-run  increase  in infla- 
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on the controlled rather than the uncontrolled period. Just as plausible is a 
post-controls rebound of  inflation as business tries to  recover its actual 
profit loss and as labor tries to recover its imaginary  wage shortfall.29 
Summary  and Conclusions 
This paper takes a detailed second look at the wage-price model that I 
published in the first part of 1971 and confirms most of its conclusions. The 
Phillips tradeoff curve shifted in an unfavorable direction in the 1960s: A 
given aggregate unemployment rate is now accompanied by a greater di- 
vergence than in the 1950s between the unemployment rates of prime-age 
male workers and those  of  women and teenagers, and thus signifies a 
greater excess demand for labor. Perry's unemployment dispersion index 
measures the shifting structure  of the labor market, and the divergence be- 
tween "total" and official unemployment seems to represent the level of 
labor demand better than the official unemployment rate by itself. In the 
long run the rate of inflation is determined primarily by excess labor de- 
mand, but the slow adjustment process in the price and wage equations 
makes the inheritance of recent inflation an important factor during the 
"short run" of one to three years. The other major factors contributing to 
the short-run pattern of inflation are (1) a deviation of productivity from 
its trend value, which tends to occur whenever the rate of output growth 
varies, and (2) changes in personal and social security tax rates. The re- 
sponse to tax changes has received insufficient  attention in previous studies; 
the average annual rate of inflation was 0.45 percent faster in 1966-69 than 
it would have been if 1965 tax rates had remained in effect.30 
The only major conclusion of the 1971 paper  that appears questionable is 
the assumption of  a fixed coefficient on expected inflation in the wage 
equation. An alternative equation is specified in which this coefficient is 
estimated to be a linear function of expected inflation and eventually to 
reach unity when the inflation rate reaches 7 percent. The variable coeffi- 
cient on expected inflation is similar in spirit to the "threshold inflation" 
29. The post-controls  wage explosion hypothesis  is supported  by the current  trend 
to shorter  contracts  noted by Bosworth. 
30. In the four years 1966-69 tax rate changes raised the rate of inflation by the 
following  annual  rates,  respectively:  0.60, 0.30, 0.36, and 0.53. This calculation  is based 
on a comparison  of two dynamic  simulations  of the model beginning  in 1966:  1, assum- 
ing (1) actual tax rate changes  and (2) no tax rate changes. Robert  J. Gordon  417 
variable of Eckstein and Brinner, but their other major conclusion-that 
the structure  of labor markets has remained unchanged since 1955-is  not 
supported. 
Several methodological points emerge from the sensitivity tests. First, 
the positive serial correlation that has plagued previous wage studies is not 
present when the dependent variable is expressed as a one-quarter change, 
instead of a two- or four-quarter change. In most cases coefficients are 
quite stable when otherwise similar one-quarter and two-quarter versions 
of wage equations are fitted, but t-ratios are quite different and, as ex- 
pected in the presence of positive serial correlation, exaggerate the statisti- 
cal significance  of variables in the two- and four-quarter  versions. Another 
important finding is that correlations among independent variables are 
sufficiently  high to require considerable care in comparisons of alternative 
models; one set of labor market variables may perform better with a par- 
ticular set of inflation or tax variables but not with some other set. 
Since the final version of the wage-price model is the same as that in my 
1971 paper, the policy conclusions are the same. A recovery of real output 
sufficient  to bring the unemployment rate down to the 4 percent  region (the 
actual 1956 average rate) will cause the rate of inflation to rise to a pace 
faster than that in 1969-70. Achievement of the administration's 2.5 per- 
cent inflation target without controls requires that the unemployment rate 
be maintained forever at about 5.2 percent. If, however, the variable co- 
efficients  version of the model is closer to the "truth," then the policy impli- 
cations are considerably more gloomy: Inflation eventually will accelerate 
at any unemployment rate below 4.8 percent. 
The model indicates that the wage-price control program has had a very 
marked  effect in moderating the rate of inflation during its first year, by an 
amount estimated to  be 1.85 percent. A corollary of this achievement is 
that the controls program is largely responsible for the rapid pace of the 
economic recovery in 1971-72; the wage-price control program has pro- 
vided the boost to real demand that the Federal Reserve Board was un- 
willing to provide in the six-quarter interval between the end of restrictive 
monetary policy in February 1970 and the imposition of the freeze in Au- 
gust 1971. Without the controls program, unemployment would have risen 
to 6.2 percent by 1972:2. Most of this achievement should be credited to 
the Price Commission, which has caused a substantial redistribution of in- 
come from business to labor and already has been responsible for a reduc- 
tion in before-tax profits by $8 billion below the no-controls level in 1972:2, 418  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1972 
with more to come in the next few quarters as the profit guidelines are 
breached by a growing number of firms. The achievement of a reduction in 
inflation is strictly temporary if the controls are lifted soon and if they have 
no lasting heritage of damping wage demands. Thus it is hard to see that 
any "success" has been achieved by the temporary control program, since 
a passing reduction in inflation hardly seems worth the effort that business- 
men, lawyers, and government officials have invested in the program. Once 
again society must face the dilemma that it cannot have full employment 
and even a 4 percent rate of inflation, much less a 2.5 percent rate, unless 
(1) controls are maintained permanently, or (2) manpower and social pro- 
grams succeed in reversing the unfavorable shift in the structure of labor 
markets by equipping women, teenagers, and disadvantaged workers to fill 
job vacancies. 
I strongly favor the second course of action. 
APPENDIX 
Symbols  and Sources  of Data 
Used  in Regressions 
THIS  APPENDIX  PROVIDES  a complete list of the symbols used in the 
regressions; the definition of the variables used; and a key to the abbrevia- 
tions used to identify the sources. 
Symbols  and  Sources 
Symbol  Name of variable  Source 
c  Consumer price index, all items  BS/SCB 
CMH  Compensation per manhour, nonfarm private  econ-  PWP 
omy 
d  Personal consumption deflator  BS/SCB Robert J. Gordon  419 
Symbol  Name of variable  Source 
d*  Eckstein-Brinner expected inflation variable with 
imposed weights: 
gd*=  0.4gd,_1+  0.3gd,2  +  0.2gd,_3  +  01  gdi  4 
de  Expected inflation variable with weights estimated  ... 
by polynomial distributed lag technique, with in- 
dividual coefficients constrained to  lie  along  a 
fourth-degree  polynomial with both a level and a 
first derivative equal to zero in the most distant 
(twelfth) period 
dT  Eckstein-Brinner  threshold inflation variable: 
=  0.0 if [(dtI  -  dt-9Vdt51 < 0.05; 
otherwise =  I[ di-d  0.05] 
DU  Unemployment dispersion index  GLP 
DG  Guidepost  dummy  RJG 
g  Rate of growth of indicated variable 
JF  Share of civilian labor force composed of females  MLR 
and males under age 20 
L  Subscript denoting sum of a series of distributed  lag  ... 
coefficients 
p  Nonfarm private deflator: 
before 1971  :3 (1963 weights)  RJG 
1971  :3 through 1972:2 (1967 weights)  SCB-2 
q  Nonfarm private output per manhour (productiv-  PWP 
ity) 
q'  Potential (standard) value of q  RJG 
Te  T8  plus Tp; form used in Gordon regressions:  ... 
g(11(1-lT.)) 
Tp  Federal plus state and local personal tax and non-  SCB-1 
tax payments divided by personal income; form 
used in Eckstein-Brinner  regressions: 
10  gzg -  4.5 gzt-1  -  3.0 gz-2  -1.5  gZ,3, 
where  Z =  1/1  -Tp 420  Brookings Papers on Econonmic  Activity, 2:1972 
Symbol  Name of variable  Source 
Ts  One-half of federal plus state and local social secu-  SCB-1 
rity tax revenue divided by total wage and salary 
payments; form used in Gordon regressions: 
gz,  -  0.35 gz,  -  0.25gz,-  2-  0.15gZ,_3-  0.05 gz,-  , 
where  Z =  1/1 -T; 
form used in Perry regressions: gz, alone. 
U  Official unemployment rate  BS/SCB 
U*  Weighted unemployment rate  GLP 
UD  Disguised unemployment rate  RJG 
UF/K  Ratio  of  unfilled orders to  shipments in durable  BCD, series 
manufacturing multiplied  by  Federal  Reserve  850 and 
manufacturing utilization index, detrended  852 
UH  Unemployment rate of hours  RJG 
w  Hourly earnings index for production workers in 
the nonfarm private economy, adjusted for over- 
time and changes in interindustry output mix: 
1954-63  RJG 
1964-72  MLR 
The published index is adjusted for fringe benefits 
as explained in RJG. 
aX  Other variables in the equation multiplied by their 
respective coefficients  ... 
Key to Sources 
BCD  Business Conditions  Digest, various issues. 
BS/SCB  U.S.  Office of  Business Economics,  Business Statistics, 
1971, for data to 1970:4, and various issues of the Survey 
of Current  Business for subsequent data. 
GLP  Data provided by George L. Perry, as used in his paper, 
"Changing Labor  Markets and  Inflation," Brookings 
Papers on Economic Activity (3:1970), pp. 411-41. 
MLR  Monthly Labor Review, various issues. 
PWP  Bureau of Labor Statistics quarterly news release, "Pro- 
ductivity, Wages, and Prices." 
RJG  Appendix C of Robert J. Gordon, "Inflation in Recession 
and Recovery," Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity 
(1: 1971), pp. 153-58. Robert J. Gordon  421 
SCB-1  The National Income anld  Product Accounts of the Uniited 
States, 1929-1965: Statistical Tables, A Supplement to 
the  Survey of  Currlent  Buisiness  (1966),  for  data  to 
1963:4, and various issues of the Survey  qf Currenit  Blusi- 
ness for subsequent data. 
SCB-2  Fixed-weight private deflator from "Alternative Measures 
of Price Change for GNP,  1969-72," Survey of Current 
Business, Vol. 52 (August 1972), pp. 33-35. Fixed-weight 
nonfarm private deflator derived by adding to the quar- 
terly rate of growth of the fixed-weight private deflator 
the difference between the quarterly rates of growth of 
the nonfarm private and private implicit deflators from 
the saimie  issue, Table 18, p. 14. 